Post-normal science

  ⁽¹⁾INESC TEC

Modern science follows principles summarised by the sociologist Robert Merton (MERTON, 1973) in the acronym CUDOS of Communalism (common property of scientific discoveries, promoting collective collaboration), Universalism (using universal and impersonal criteria, regardless of gender, race, religion), Disinterestedness (actions motivated by the common scientific good and not by personal gain) and Organized skepticism (impartial critical scrutiny, peer review). As a human cultural activity, science cannot be entirely objective but still strives diligently for objectivity and nurtures self-correcting mechanisms. A scientific fact is not understood as an absolute truth, but rather as the most plausible explanation, taking into account the observations and scientific theories considered valid. As such, it can be replaced by an alternative explanation in face of new data or new knowledge. A fact is not scientific, even if expressed by a scientifically educated individual or a professional scientist, if the scientific method is not followed, for example when alternative explanations are not considered, or when an explanation is chosen just because it agrees with a specific school of thought. Although these are well established and widely accepted principles of scientific practice, their application is put to the test in post-normal conditions. The social pressure to which scientific practice is subject under post-normal situations affects the scientific process itself and its results. In post-normal conditions, the predisposition to choose topics considered socially relevant is inevitable, and explanations consistent with the dominant social view preferred. For example, considering climate, the usefulness of science to either achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement or to postpone profound economic changes becomes the main focus, rather than the soundness of the science that informs those decisions. The usefulness of science, and its consistency with cultural and political preferences, becomes more important than its solidity in terms of methodological rigor (for example, consistency with Merton norms). Paradoxically, the usefulness of science to inform decision-making processes becomes then significantly reduced, since it no longer has the distance, focus and impartiality that are precisely its strength. In order to maintain the undeniable usefulness of science to society, particularly in understanding complex phenomena, even in emergency and high-risk situations, as in the case of climate change, science should insist on the methodological rigor that is its strength. Education of younger generations of scientists on the fundamental principles of rigorous scientific inquiry is crucial (RAVETZ, 2019), and more emphasis should be given to science education than to apparently less useful subjects, such as philosophy or the history of science. For those who do not deal directly with scientific issues, it is even more difficult to comprehend the distinctive character of the scientific method, resulting sometimes in the overestimation of the power of science and in what it can effectively contribute to society, and at other times to the underestimation and discredit of scientific results. This polarization is exacerbated in post-normal situations, when science is seen as either meeting or failing societal expectations, irrespective of science’s validity.